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Old-fashioned empire is suddenly everywhere. In the United
States, discussions of empire used to look as much to what we now call
"soft power" as to the seemingly atavistic technologies of high nine-
teenth-century imperial powers. McDonald's and Coca-Cola, Micro-
soft and Intel - these were the purveyors of the distinctively Ameri-
can empire of commerce and markets.1 Since 9/1I, however, the
traditional approach to empire has come to the fore with all the trap-
pings: soldiers, invasions, occupations, and prisoners. Hard power is
back, and so too are a set of difficult constitutional questions: about
the Constitution and foreign affairs, about the significance of interna-
* Professor of Law and History, Columbia University. Many thanks to Christina Burnett,
Sam Issacharoff, Tom Lee, Gerry Neuman, and Chuck Sabel for helpful readings. Alexander
Michaels, Columbia Law School Class of 2008, provided stellar research assistance in the prepa-
ration of this Review.
I See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD (995); VICTORIA DE GRAZIA,
IRRESISTIBLE EMPIRE (2005); THE IMPERIAL TENSE: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS IN
AMERICAN EMPIRE (Andrew J. Bacevich ed., 2003); JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER (2004).
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tional law, and about the relationship of foreign affairs authority to
domestic rights and powers, to mention only a few.
2
Such questions, to be sure, were never far away. Issues such as the
western expansion of the territory of the United States,3 the relative
powers of the President and Congress in foreign affairs and war-
making,4 the territorial applicability of the U.S. Constitution,5 and the
relationship between domestic law and the law of nations6 have been
recurrent features of American constitutional dialogue since the
Founding.
It has been at least a century, however, stretching back to the Span-
ish-American War and its aftermath, since the model of empire was so
hotly contested in American public life.7 Today, supporters and critics
of American power alike seize on the example of empire to illustrate
their claims. Analogies to empire serve alternately as arguments for
the liberalizing effects of American global power, on one hand, and as
anticolonialist critiques of American foreign policy, on the other.8
2 A small sample of the books published on empire in the past few years includes ANDREW J.
BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S.
DIPLOMACY (2002); NICHOLAS B. DIRKS, THE SCANDAL OF EMPIRE: INDIA AND THE
CREATION OF IMPERIAL BRITAIN (2o06); HAROLD JAMES, THE ROMAN PREDICAMENT.
HOW THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER CREATE THE POLITICS OF EMPIRE (20o6);
CHARLES S. MAIER, AMONG EMPIRES: AMERICAN ASCENDANCY AND ITS PREDECESSORS
(2006); and BERNARD PORTER, EMPIRE AND SUPEREMPIRE: BRITAIN, AMERICA AND THE
WORLD (2o6).
3 See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE:
TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (2004); PATRICIA NELSON
LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST. THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST
(1987); Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded To Include The Insular Cases and
the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241 (2000).
4 See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
5 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (i9 How.) 393 (1857); Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous
Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. I197 (1996).
6 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. I (2oo6);
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nine-
teenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 8i TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002); Vicki C.
Jackson, The Supreme Court, 2oo4 Term-Comment: Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence,
Resistance, Engagement, 19 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005).
7 See generally WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE ROOTS OF THE MODERN
AMERICAN EMPIRE 43-46, 405-28 (1969) (describing controversies over the Spanish-American
War).
8 For enthusiasts of American empire, see MAX BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE:
SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER (2002); NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS:
THE PRICE OF AMERICA'S EMPIRE (2o04); ROBERT D. KAPLAN, IMPERIAL GRUNTS: THE
AMERICAN MILITARY ON THE GROUND (2005); and Max Boot, The Case for American Empire,
WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. i5, 2001, at 27. For critics, see MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO
NEGRI, EMPIRE (2ooo). A third view defends American global power but rejects the label "em-
pire." See, e.g., MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS
AS THE WORLD'S GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY i-6 (2005).
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The Supreme Court's post-9/i I terrorism cases offer a leading ex-
ample. Lawyers for detainees have rested their claims on historical
traditions of habeas corpus that purport to extend back into the long
history of British imperial constitutionalism. 9 Bush Administration
supporters, by contrast, have responded that the legacy of British im-
perialism cuts precisely the opposite way and supports the Administra-
tion's claims to executive authority in the struggle against terrorism.10
Indeed, all sides in the debate over empire claim to be champions of
the rule of law in their mobilizations of the history of empire. For em-
pire's critics, the long history of empire in the West (stretching back to
Rome) has been one in which republican rule-of-law guarantees inevi-
tably give way to imperial authoritarianisms. 1 1 For empire's advo-
cates, empires have spread order around the world and brought the
rule of law to places where once only anarchy governed.12
The law of empire has moved front and center in American public
discourse in significant part because arguments among American law-
yers, politicians, and public intellectuals offer a startlingly close replay
of the debates that occupied Victorian jurists a century and a half ago
at the height of the British Empire. To be sure, most attempts to ap-
propriate the legacy of the Empire in contemporary U.S. constitution-
alism are patched together from fantasy and fiction. The contending
sides typically offer little more than highly idealized versions of the
historical practices they purport to describe. The traditions of Anglo-
American constitutionalism are alternately said to have allocated more
formal power to the Crown than they actually did and to have im-
posed constraints on imperial power that they almost certainly never
did. Fantasy and fiction notwithstanding, however, the Anglo-
American law of empire has remained strikingly similar over the past
9 See, e.g., Brief for the Bar Human Rights Comm. of the Bar of Eng. & Wales & the Com-
monwealth Lawyers Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 53975, at *6-16; Petitioners' Brief on the Merits,
Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL 162758, at *23-24; Brief
Amici Curiae of Legal Historians Listed Herein in Support of the Petitioners, Rasul, 124 S. Ct.
2686 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL 96756, at *6-1o; Brief for the Commonwealth Lawyers
Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (Nos. 03-334, 03-
343), 2004 WI 7 3 25 8, at *4-10; see also Brief of Lawrence M. Friedman et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. o5-184), 2006 WL 53971, at *1o-I6 (using the
Barbary Wars as a historical example to illustrate the United States's adherence to international
laws and customs).
10 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors et al. in Support of Respondents, Rasul,
124 S. Ct. 2686 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL 419453.
11 Classic studies include PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS
(1987), and J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975). For one of many recent
studies, see JAMES, supra note 2.
12 See, e.g., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The American National Interest and Global Public Goods, 78
INT'L AFFAIRS 233, 241 (2002); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 786-87 (2004).
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150 years, its landmarks remarkably little changed by the winds of
time. Like their nineteenth-century British predecessors, American
constitutionalists now debate the allocation of foreign affairs powers
between the legislative and executive branches. They debate the ex-
tent to which such allocations of power are susceptible to judicial re-
view. They debate the merits of emergency exceptions to constitu-
tional systems.
Properly understood, the structure of Anglo-American empire -
what eighteenth-century English lawyers would have called its consti-
tution - offers one way of making sense of the Supreme Court's ap-
proach in cases such as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 13 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 14
and Rasul v. Bush,15 a way that neither the Bush Administration nor
its opponents have suggested. There is at least one critical difference
between the constitutionalisms of the twenty-first and nineteenth cen-
turies: the culture of American foreign affairs constitutionalism is radi-
cally more polarized than the constitutionalism of the nineteenth-
century British Empire; it includes claims of unilateral executive au-
thority, on one hand, and judicially enforceable individual constitu-
tional rights, on the other. Its British predecessor, by contrast, rejected
both executive unilateralism and judicially enforceable constitutional
rights in favor of a model that placed virtually all questions in the
hands of Parliament. 16 What the Court has done in the past several
years is rein in the polarizing outliers and restore something approach-
ing the Anglo-American constitutional-imperial debates of old.
Much as Victorian British constitutionalism vested ultimate author-
ity in Parliament, the early rounds of post-9/Ii decisions by the Su-
preme Court appear to have allocated considerable power to Con-
gress. 17 The Military Commissions Act of 2OO6,18 which among other
things purports to establish statutory standards for the trial of detain-
ees, 19 will likely soon test this approach. Yet if the historical analogy
of empire is properly understood, the prospects for a harmonious con-
stitutionalism of empire in a Victorian key are both less propitious and
13 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2oo6).
14 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
15 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
16 See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 287-94 (9th ed. 1952).
17 So far, the Court's decisions have tracked the historical patterns traced by Samuel Issa-
charoff and Richard Pildes. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Liber-
tarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During War-
time, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 161
(Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
18 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 26oo (2o06) (Westlaw) (to be codified in scattered sections of
IO U.S.C.).
19 See id. §§ 948a-950w, 120 Stat. at 2600-30.
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more important than at first glance they appear. If the real British
Empire would please stand up, we would see a legal regime that pro-
vided precious few answers to its own critical questions. It is all the
more daunting, then, that the constitution of empire may well be the
most effective tool history offers us for limiting the abuses that seem to
come in empire's train.
This essay reviews four books that, among the spate of books on
empire in the past few years, shed especially illuminating light on the
law of Anglo-American empire during the past three centuries. Part I
describes the central tenets of one of the new poles in the early-twenty-
first-century constitution of empire: the idea of the imperial executive
as advanced by the constitutional lawyer John Yoo in his book, The
Powers of War and Peace.20 Part II turns to two historico-imperial
analogies that animate arguments for the imperial executive; in par-
ticular, Part II addresses lawyer-historian Daniel Hulsebosch's Consti-
tuting Empire2 1 and historian Niall Ferguson's Empire22 in order to
assess the strengths and limits of analogies between the governance of
the British Empire and the idea of the imperial executive. Part III
takes up A Jurisprudence of Power,23 a book by historian R.W. Kostal
on the martial law controversy in Jamaica in the 'i86os. Kostal's im-
plicit suggestion is that the overarching continuity in the Anglo-
American law of empire over the past 150 years has been the centrality
of legal language in moral argument about empire and its virtues,
vices, and exigencies. Part IV compares the British imperial constitu-
tion with its American counterpart in the early twenty-first century.
The conclusion relates the constitution of the British Empire to the
U.S. Supreme Court's efforts - successful or not, we cannot yet know
- to rein in the poles of the debate and to establish boundaries for the
legal frame of Anglo-American empire. The Court's great challenge is
that the institutions and discourse of American constitutional law
make available a much wider array of possible moves in constitutional
argument than the U.S. Constitution's British antecedents ever did.
I. THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE
No one has deployed the imperial theory of American foreign af-
fairs constitutionalism more elaborately and to greater effect than John
20 JOHN YOo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/1I (2005).
21 DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830 (2005).
22 NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE BRITISH WORLD ORDER
AND THE LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POWER (2oo4).
23 R.W. KOSTAL, A JURISPRUDENCE OF POWER: VICTORIAN EMPIRE AND THE RULE OF
LAW (2oo5).
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Yoo, a former lawyer in the Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel and a law professor at the University of California at Berke-
ley.24 For a decade now, Yoo has helped lead an energetic assault on
the conventional wisdom of the law of foreign affairs in areas such as
the law of war,25 the law of treaties,26 the constitutional constraints on
multilateralism, 27 the domestic status of international law, 28 and the
law of international bodies such as the United Nations. 29 After 9/II,
these topics took center stage in American law. Yoo's expertise and his
position in the Justice Department made him a principal actor in the
renewed debates about the Executive and foreign affairs. As such, his
role in shaping the Bush Administration's legal strategy is well known.
His book, The Powers of War and Peace, encapsulates a decade of
work in the field and has become a leading (if deeply flawed) state-
ment of the law of the so-called Bush doctrine of preemptive war.30
The challenges advanced by The Powers of War and Peace to the
conventional scholarly wisdom in the law of foreign affairs have been
rehearsed many times by supporters and critics alike. 3 1 Yoo's ideas
make up a tightly bound package of arguments. In each of the areas
he addresses (with a few interesting exceptions), Yoo's contention is
that the executive branch has broad constitutional powers that cannot
24 See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 18-20 (2oo6).
25 See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding
of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996).
26 See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (ig9); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The
Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001); John C.
Yoo, Treaties and Non-Self-Execution, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 47 (2000); John Yoo, Trea-
ties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 2218 (1999).
27 See John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1673 (2oo0).
28 See Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
291 (2005); John Yoo, Peeking Abroad?: The Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Precedents in Con-
stitutional Cases, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 385 (2004).
29 See John C. Voo, Force Rules: UN Reform and Intervention, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 641 (2006);
John C. Yoo & Will Trachman, Less than Bargained for: The Use of Force and the Declining
Relevance of the United Nations, 5 CHI. J. INT'L LAW 379 (2005).
30 See WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 6 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
31 For prominent criticisms of Yoo's work, see Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (999);
Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 1O5 COLUM. L.
REV. 168x (2005); and Cass R. Sunstein, The 9/5t Constitution, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 16, 2oo6,
at 21. For supporters, see David J. Bederman, Book Reviews, ioo AM. J. INT'L L. 490 (2oo6) (re-
viewing YOO, supra note 2o)), and David B. Rivkin Jr. & Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, Rights and
Conflicts, NAT'L REV., Nov. 21, 2005, at 48 (reviewing same).
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be overridden: not by congressional action or judicial intervention, and
certainly not by treaty obligations or international legal norms.
On the question of the executive war power, Yoo contends that the
Constitution allocates the power to make war to the executive branch.
According to Yoo's account, a heady but disorganized decade of revo-
lutionary excess led the Framers of the Constitution to restore what he
calls the "customary constitutional balance" of the eighteenth-century
English government, a balance in which the monarchy had virtually
exclusive authority over foreign affairs and war.32 (Yoo surely savors
the irony that his right-leaning Thermidorian view of the Constitution
matches Charles Beard's famous left-leaning Thermidorian critique
from a century ago.33) As a result, Yoo contends, the clauses of Article
II vesting the executive power in the President 34 and making the
President "Commander in Chief ' 35 allocate a broad, unenumerated
power in foreign affairs and war to the executive branch, much like
the power Yoo tells us the Crown enjoyed in traditional British
constitutionalism. 36
Yoo describes the enumerated foreign affairs powers that the Con-
stitution allocates to Congress as quite narrow, consistent with the
broad authority he contends the Constitution confers on the Executive.
In Yoo's view, for example, the clause of Article I allocating to the leg-
islature the power to declare war 37 merely authorizes Congress to initi-
ate formal warfare. The clause thereby prevents the Executive from
unilaterally plunging the nation into an all-out war (or, as Yoo calls it,
"total war"), to which all of the duties and obligations of war under
domestic law and the law of nations attach. 38 But Congress's war
power does nothing (Yoo insists) to limit the Executive's much broader
authority to initiate and wage wars short of formal or total war.39 To
be sure, Article I also gives Congress the power to "make Rules con-
cerning Captures on Land and Water";40 to "raise and support Ar-
mies";41 to "provide and maintain a Navy";42 to "make Rules for the
32 YOO, supra note 20, at 141.
33 See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES (Transaction Publishers 1938) (1913).
34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. I.
35 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
36 See YOO, supra note 2o, at 18.
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I I.
38 YOO, supra note 20, at 120, 151-52. The salient differences between armed conflict accom-
panied by a congressional declaration of war and armed conflict initiated by the Executive alone
with no such accompanying declaration are never entirely clear from Yoo's account.
39 See id. at 152.
40 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. i i.
41 Id. art I, § 8, cl. 12.
42 Id. art I, § 8, cl. 13.
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Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces";43 to "pro-
vide for calling forth the Militia" 44 and to "provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining, the Militia. ''45  Yoo contends, however, that
these specifically enumerated powers carve out only narrow exceptions
from the British Empire-inspired background of a plenary Com-
mander-in-Chief authority vested in the Executive. Indeed, the argu-
ment goes even further. As Yoo made clear in memoranda written for
the Bush Administration in 2002, the theory holds that congressional
legislation purporting to interfere with the inherent power of the Ex-
ecutive to command the military would be unconstitutional.46  The
Commander-in-Chief powers drawn from the experience of empire are
not subject to limits imposed by Congress or set out in either treaties
or customary international law.4
7
Yoo identifies additional broad executive authority in the making,
interpretation, and abrogation of treaties. 4 Once again, in Yoo's ac-
count, the Framers' constitution restored the plenary executive power
in foreign affairs characteristic of the English constitution.49 Like the
eighteenth-century British monarchs, Yoo contends, the President may
terminate or suspend treaties unilaterally. Yoo writes that the Presi-
dent may decline to ratify treaties even after they have been approved
by the Senate. And Yoo's reading of the law gives the President
wide discretion to interpret treaties. Congress's powers are accord-
ingly limited. 50
This is not to say that Yoo believes Congress is without power to
check the Executive in matters of foreign affairs. Yoo's position is that
congressional power in this domain is actually quite robust, but that it
is limited to several distinct constitutional devices. The most impor-
43 Id. art I, § 8, cl. 14.
44 Id. art I, § 8, cl. 15.
4S Id. art I, § 8, cl. 16.
46 See Letter from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU
GHRAIB 218 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005); Memorandum from Jay S. By-
bee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in
THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 172, 200-07 [hereinafter August 2002 Memorandum].
47 See August 2002 Memorandum, supra note 46, at 203 (discussing the Executive's independ-
ence from congressional regulation); YOO, supra note 2o, at 172-73 (discussing the Executive's
independence from international law).
48 See YOO, supra note 2o, at 183-84, 190-98.
49 See id. at 31-45.
50 See id. at 184, igo-98. Yoo does not contemplate the possibility that allocating treaty ter-
mination power to the Executive but not interpretive authority might bolster political account-
ability in foreign affairs. Yoo's position on the executive power to interpret treaties was impliedly
rejected in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), in which the Court construed the Geneva
Convention (as implemented by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, io U.S.C.A. §§ 801-946
(West 1998 & Supp. 20o6)) as barring the President's unilateral implementation of military tribu-
nals. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793.
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tant such mechanism is the power of the purse. Through its spending
power, Yoo insists, Congress (like the eighteenth-century Parliament
before it) can simply starve the Executive's foreign affairs adventures.
The impeachment power gives Congress further oversight power in
the realm of foreign affairs, as does Congress's legislative authority
over domestic affairs.5 '
Moreover, Yoo identifies controversial limits on the executive
branch's powers in three areas. First, Yoo concludes that treaty obli-
gations entered into by the Executive and concurred in by two-thirds
of the Senate are not self-executing parts of domestic American law.5 2
He reaches this conclusion against the weight of the text of the Su-
premacy Clause, which describes treaties as "the supreme Law of the
Land,"5 3 and also against the force of rulings by the Supreme Court to
the contrary54  Interestingly, Yoo's claim that treaties are not self-
executing represents a limit on executive power. Yoo's approach
would place sharp limits on the extent to which the Executive could
use treaties to create binding legal rules absent implementing legisla-
tion by the full Congress. Yoo warns that any other approach to un-
derstanding the treaty power would create "an almost unlimited au-
thority to legislate" outside of the formal and often cumbersome
requirements of the full Congress.55
By the same token, the Constitution's finely arranged system for
enacting domestic legislation prohibits the creation of treaties by con-
gressional-executive agreement rather than through Senate ratification.
Congressional-executive agreements involve the full Congress, to be
sure; indeed, they enact public laws. But they allow the Executive and
Congress to create treaty obligations without the agreement of two-
thirds of the Senate, as is required for the approval of treaties,5 6 and
even over the objection of the Executive if a congressional supermajor-
ity overrides the Executive's veto.5 7 The risk, Yoo suggests, is that
congressional-executive agreements may undermine the broad alloca-
tion of foreign affairs authority to the Executive. Even when the
holder of the executive office prefers a congressional-executive agree-
ment as the route to ratifying a treaty, the Executive cannot choose
51 See YOO, supra note 20, at 86. Yoo rejects the longstanding objection that political dynam-
ics will effectively prevent Congress from removing funding from under the feet of troops com-
mitted to a foreign conflict by the Executive. See id. at 159.
52 See id. at 215-49.
53 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
54 See Vdlzquez, supra note 3, at 2189 n.143, 219o n.144 (collecting cases on self-executing
treaties).
55 YOO, supra note 2o, at 223.
56 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
57 Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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that route because it threatens to undermine the power of the execu-
tive branch. 58
The third limit on the imperial executive is a limitation on multi-
lateralism. Yoo's foreign affairs analysis leads him to conclude that
the Constitution does not permit the Executive to commit troops to
serve under foreign command.5 9 The Appointments Clause, 60 Yoo ar-
gues, prohibits the President from delegating power to individuals who
are independent of the President's control.61 When President Clinton
placed U.S. troops under the command of foreign officers during the
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, for example, the delegation of
command violated the Constitution. 62 Article II of the Constitution, it
seems, not only authorizes the imperial executive but also precludes its
ability to act multilaterally.
What is most interesting about Yoo's book is not the particular ar-
guments it makes but its sources and its underlying logic. Others have
taken Yoo's arguments to task, Cass Sunstein and Jeremy Waldron re-
cently among them.63 There is not much need to add here to the criti-
cisms that have been made elsewhere. Yoo egregiously fails to present
counterevidence against his claims. 64 His arguments engage in foren-
sic bootstrapping, as when he spuriously converts Wilson's and
Madison's statements that treaties "may" or "sometimes" require con-
gressional implementation into claims that treaties are not self-
enforcing. 65  Yoo's arguments are repeatedly question-begging, as
when he insists that treaties are not self-implementing because the
treaty power must comport with "the distribution of powers between
the general and state governments. '66 The book's claims are plagued
by inconsistency. 67
58 See YOO, supra note 20, at 270-78. The exception (which may swallow the rule) is that con-
gressional-executive agreements are permitted to create treaty obligations in areas in which Con-
gress is granted plenary constitutional authority by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. One
such area is the regulation of foreign commerce. See id. at 274.
59 See id. at 173-81.
60 U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2.
61 See YOo, supra note 2o, at 177.
62 See id. at 175-81.
63 See Waldron, supra note 31; Sunstein, supra note 31.
64 See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 23-24.
65 See YOO, supra note 2o, at 119, 136.
66 Id. at 222 (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840)); see also id. at 226
(noting with disapproval that if treaties created binding domestic law, federal law could be made
without bicameral approval in the Congress and presentment to the President).
67 For example, Yoo contends that congressional participation in treaty implementation en-
courages transparency, reasoned discussion of important issues, political stability, and "broader
political acceptance." Id. at 224. Yet all of these virtues are undermined by Yoo's arguments for
a strong executive branch in foreign affairs. Preservation of these values seems to concern Yoo
most when that preservation obstructs the implementation of treaty norms. See id. at 226. Con-
sider also Yoo's shifting uses of evidence from the Antifederalists and Federalists during the rati-
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And yet making sense of the argument for which Yoo's work has
come to stand is vitally important. The first round of histories con-
cerning foreign affairs in the United States after 9/I i suggests that the
contested emergence of a radically expansive new theory of executive
power may be among the lasting contributions of 9/II to American
constitutionalism. 6  If we are to understand the ideas that animate the
imperial executive, there are few better places to start than Yoo's book.
Cynics, of course, will tell us that ideas do not matter so much as
politics. All that matters in understanding Yoo's package of positions,
critics suggest, is the political goals of the Bush Administration and the
cadre of political lawyers who staffed the Administration's legal posts
in the months and years following 9/Ii. It is hardly surprising that
such cynics abound. The Powers of War and Peace seeks to advance
the Administration's aspirations to broad executive power in foreign
affairs while holding off the kinds of domestic regulatory authority
that the Bush Administration purports to dislike. Similarly, the book
advances an argument for an executive power over foreign affairs that
is virtually unlimited except when it comes to the kinds of multilater-
alism that the Bush Administration disdains. Nonetheless, critiques of
Yoo's ideas as pure politics are almost certainly misguided.
II. THE ANALOGY TO THE BRITISH EMPIRE
Lurking alongside debates over the imperial executive is a hotly
contested historical analogy between the United States and the British
Empire. Great Britain, after all, was the modern world's first he-
gemon, and some today would have the United States recast itself in
its image. In particular, defenders of a strong American presence in
the world have recently become enamored of two features said to have
characterized the British Empire: its constitutional structure (as inter-
preted, almost certainly incorrectly, by the proponents of American
fying debates in the fall of 1787. Yoo relies heavily on the Antifederalists' strategic descriptions of
the Constitution as creating an executive branch with what was to their lights dangerously broad
authority akin to that of the British monarchy; such Antifederalist critiques become evidence for
Yoo that the Constitution does indeed embrace a powerful Executive modeled on the monarchy of
the British constitution, notwithstanding Federalist protestations to the contrary. See id. at -i i-
14, 122-24. But when the Antifederalists (using precisely the same strategy they had employed in
comparing the Executive to the British monarchy) identified the treaty power as self-executing
and thus a threat to the legislative power vested in the House of Representatives, Yoo prefers the
protestations of their Federalist opponents. See id. at 115-2o. The strategic imperatives of the
ratification debates ensured that there would be language from one side or the other on which
Yoo would be able to draw. Yoo seems simply to draw his evidence from whichever side hap-
pened to favor the proposition he seeks to sustain.
68 See, e.g., GEORGE PACKER, THE ASSASSINS' GATE (2005); Jane Mayer, The Hidden
Power: The Legal Mind Behind the White House's War on Terror, NEW YORKER, July 3, 2006, at
44; Jeffrey Rosen, Power of One, NEW REPUBLIC, July 24, 2oo6, at 8, io.
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power), and its role as global policeman during the period of the so-
called Pax Britannica.
A. The Structure of the Empire
In Yoo's account, American foreign affairs constitutionalism was
modeled explicitly on its British predecessor. "The Framers were for-
mer citizens of the British Empire, '6 9 Yoo claims, who solved the
founding era's foreign affairs questions "by explicit analogy to the
British model. '70  That model, Yoo contends, was one in which the
monarchy held virtually plenary power in the realm of foreign affairs.
"The eighteenth-century English monarch," Yoo writes, "was com-
mander in chief of the armed forces and possessed exclusive power to
enter into treaties, to declare war, and to raise and regulate the army
and navy.'71 This system "inform[ed]" the Framers' debates. 72 In-
deed, Yoo asserts that "the Framers intended to adopt the traditional
system they knew," a system in which "foreign affairs remained an ex-
ecutive power. ' 73
The problem is that the Framers almost certainly knew no such
system. Legal historian Daniel Hulsebosch's recent book, Constituting
Empire, is wonderfully revelatory on this score. Judging from Hulse-
bosch's account of constitutional politics in New York from the colo-
nial period into the early republic, Yoo seems to have at least one thing
right: American constitutionalism is inescapably the outgrowth and
continuation of the British imperial project. As Hulsebosch's nuanced
account puts it, American constitutionalism was "conditioned" by the
experience and the lessons of the sprawling empire from which it
emerged.7 4 Indeed, Hulsebosch contends that Anglo-American consti-
tutionalism more generally arose out of the imperial experience:
"[o]verseas expansion and the English constitution developed simulta-
neously and reciprocally, each structuring the other. ' 75  Even the
common law itself - conceived as a body of rights rather than as a set
of interwoven jurisdictions linked to the Crown - emerged in the im-
perial experience as settlers and colonists exported the substantive law
of the common law courts outside of its initial jurisdictional setting.76
69 YOO, supra note 20, at 31.
70 Id. at 67.
71 Id. at 53.
72 Id. at 54.
73 Id. at 88.
74 HULSEBOSCH, supra note 21, at 143.
75 Id. at i5.
76 See id. at 31-32.
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In turn, constitutionalism and the common law provided the language
and the mechanics of empire. 77
But this is where the similarities between Hulsebosch's and Yoo's
accounts end. For as Hulsebosch brilliantly describes, the constitution
of the British Empire was rarely settled and almost always hotly con-
tested. There were, Hulsebosch tells us, many constitutions of empire
in the eighteenth-century British Atlantic, at least three of which
played themselves out in the American Revolution. First was the con-
stitution of the Crown's imperial agents. This is essentially the model
of the British Empire that Yoo champions. According to the Crown's
imperial agents in North America, colonies were "subsidiary unit[s]" of
an empire in which royal prerogative was the dominant power.78 Un-
der this theory of the structure of the British Empire, Parliament's au-
thority paled in comparison to the authority of the King and his
agents.79
But the imperial agents' theory of the Empire was only one theory
among many. The American creole elite held a counter-theory of the
imperial constitution, one that harkened back to the ideas of Sir Ed-
ward Coke in the seventeenth-century common law.8 0 In particular,
the creole theory espoused an ancient constitution of English rights
and liberties to which the King and his Parliament were bound. This,
of course, was one of the constitutional idioms that would be expressed
most strongly in the 176os and 1770s as the American Revolution
approached."'
A third view crystallized in the middle of the eighteenth century. It
held simply that Parliament was supreme over the Crown on one hand
and over the accumulated customs of the common law on the other.
According to the parliamentary supremacy school, imperial agents and
the colonies' creole elite were clinging to competing sets of equally
anachronistic ideas about the English constitution, one set rooted in
the now-constrained royal prerogative, the other in Coke's shadowy
seventeenth-century ideas about constitutional constraints on Parlia-
ment. In the colonies, as at home, the English Parliament was simply
the sovereign. 2
In the ever-changing, always-contested context of the imperial con-
stitution, it is little wonder that the British constitutional tradition
77 See id. at 8.
78 HULSEBOSCH, supra note 21, at 77.
79 See id. at 76-78.
80 See id. at 29-32.
81 See id. at 84-86, 9o-96; see also Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case
for the Colonists, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1157 (1976).
82 See HULSEBOSCH, supra note 2 1, at 134. Hulsebosch also describes a fourth, shadowy ap-
proach to the constitution of the British Empire, which he associates with the settlers on the colo-
nial frontier. See id. at 101-04.
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rarely yielded clear answers to the controversies of the empire. Hulse-
bosch does not go so far as his colleague John Philip Reid, who con-
tends that the British constitution was "whatever could be plausibly
argued and forcibly maintained. 8 3 But Hulsebosch's constitution (like
Reid's) was susceptible to many different interpretations and open to
many competing claims. If the law of empire was "imperial and inte-
grative" in one time and place, it quickly proved "provincial and disin-
tegrative" in another, as competing factions of imperial agents and cre-
ole elites vied for the soul of the constitution.8 4 As the historian and
lawyer Mary Sarah Bilder has recently explained, the basic principles
of empire were rarely settled. Indeed, on Bilder's reading (a reading
with which Hulsebosch seems to concur), the absence of certainty and
resolution in the law of empire was critical to the workings of an
empire that valued "pragmatism and flexibility" even at the cost of
uncertainty. 85
Martial law provides a good example of the kind of legal indeter-
minacy and ambiguity that historians like Hulsebosch, Reid, and
Bilder have found. Martial law was an imperial practice with multiple
traditions. Creole elites contended that the common law and the Brit-
ish constitution prohibited military court jurisdiction over civilians or
at the very least over British civilians. They could even cite to com-
mon law authorities and parliamentary legislation suggesting as much.
But the imperatives of empire led military authorities to try civilians
in military courts throughout the American Revolution. Imperial doc-
trine and imperial practice ran against one another, and in the ancient,
custom-based, and almost always ambiguous constitution of the com-
mon law, who was to say which better embodied the constitution's
view of martial law?86
Hulsebosch persuasively argues that the ambivalences of the law of
empire stemmed from a deep tension in British imperial practice "be-
tween the rule of law and the expansion of rule."87 The tension ran
through the law of empire, and it animated Britain's conflicts with lo-
cal elites in the North American colonies. Hulsebosch argues further
that the tension survived the American Revolution and shaped Ameri-
can constitutionalism for a century to come. Here he is slightly less
successful in his presentation, though not because he is wrong. Ex-
83 John Phillip Reid, In a Defensive Rage: The Uses of the Mob, the Justification in Law, and
the Coming of the American Revolution, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1043, IO87 (i974).
84 HULSEBOSCH, supra note 21, at io.
85 MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL
CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE 7 (2004); see also Lauren Benton, Constitutions and Empires, 31 L.
& SOC. INQUIRY 177 (2006) (reviewing Bilder's book and commenting more generally on the rela-
tionship between empires and constitutions).
86 See HULSEBOSCH, supra note 21, at 157-58.
87 Id. at io.
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pansion and the imperial questions it occasioned remained central in
American constitutionalism well into the twentieth century.8 8  Yet
Hulsebosch's focus on New York - wonderful as it is for his treat-
ment of the eighteenth century - does not give us an especially good
view of the new questions of empire that arose somewhat further west
in the first decades of the nineteenth century.
For the eighteenth century, Hulsebosch's work makes abundantly
clear just how thin the imperial executive account of the British con-
stitution really is. Many of the difficulties of the imperial executive
argument appear on its face. Yoo, for example, inadvertently makes
clear that the British constitution granted far more foreign affairs
power to Parliament than he means to suggest. Blackstone's view of
parliamentary power (which Yoo quotes8 9 ) was that it was "sovereign
and uncontrol[l]able" in matters "ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, mili-
tary, maritime, or criminal."90 Yoo describes these powers as "domes-
tic" in character,9 1 but it would be hard to craft a more sweeping defi-
nition of the legislative power. From the Restoration onward,
Parliament took on progressively greater authority in areas that had
once been largely under the control of the Crown, especially foreign af-
fairs. Beginning with its power of the purse, the House of Commons
slowly increased its authority such that by the time of the American
Revolution, as the historian H.M. Scott has recently observed, the min-
isters "controlled British diplomacy. '92 The transformation of British
government and the erosion of the Crown's executive power thus came
before the American Revolution, not (as Yoo contends) after it.93 In-
deed, as Hulsebosch notes, after the Revolution the authority of the
Crown's agents in places like India was if anything substantially in-
creased to prevent additional outbreaks of colonial resistance. 94 To be
sure, Yoo's favored power of the purse was the route Parliament took
in establishing the ministry system. But once Parliament adopted that
course, its power in the realm of foreign affairs quickly outstripped
that of the Crown.
If Congress were to adopt a stance on the power of the purse as ag-
gressive as the one taken by the eighteenth-century British Parliament,
there is good reason to suspect that Yoo would find constitutional
grounds to object. "It is subject to serious constitutional question,"
88 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 251-52.
89 YOO, supra note 20, at 43.
90 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *156.
91 YOO, supra note 20, at 43.
92 H.M. SCOTT, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 8 (99o).
93 See E.R. Turner, Parliament and Foreign Affairs, 1603-r760, 34 ENG. HIST. REv 172, 196-
97 (1919).
94 See HULSEBOSCH, supra note 2i, at 168.
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Yoo recently wrote elsewhere, "whether Congress can use the appro-
priations power to interfere with areas of plenary presidential
power."95 It is perhaps unsurprising that Yoo should think this: advo-
cates of broad executive authority have made such arguments against
conditional funding and other uses of Congress's power of the purse
for years. 96 But in Yoo's hands, the argument against conditional
funding is peculiarly arresting. In his book and in his earlier articles,
Yoo repeatedly relies on the congressional spending power to assure
his critics that there are constitutional checks on the imperial execu-
tive.9 7 If in the end the power of the purse were itself tightly hemmed
in by constitutional limits, then we would truly be in a brave new
world of executive power.
B. Pax Britannica / Pax Americana
The imperial executive theory relies just as heavily on a second di-
mension of British imperial history.. This second dimension is the Brit-
ish Empire as liberal world hegemon. In looking toward a Pax Ameri-
cana that might reproduce the ostensible virtues of the long-lost Pax
Britannica, a growing chorus of voices in recent years purports to have
rediscovered the virtues of empire in the liberal achievements of the
British Empire.98 Yoo, for example, cites the British Empire's suc-
cesses in ending the slave trade and abolishing slavery.99 Others note
the British role in eliminating the practice of sati, in which Hindu
widows in India immolated themselves upon the deaths of their hus-
bands. 10 0 Of special interest here is the British Empire's success in
combating the problem of piracy on the high seas. The analogy to ter-
rorism is clear. 0 1 What the British did against nefarious transnational
slave traders and pirates on the high seas, goes the liberal hegemon
theory, the United States may perhaps now be able to do against the
similarly stateless forces of global terrorism. Creating the constitu-
95 John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1202 (2004).
96 See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Com-
mander in Chief, 8o VA. L. REV. 833 (1994); J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse,
1989 DUKE L.J. 1162.
97 See, e.g., YOO, supra note 2o, at 22.
98 See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 8; Boot, supra note 8.
99 Yoo, supra note 29, at 654.
100 See, e.g., FERGUSON, supra note 22, at 144-46. On sati, see generally SATI, THE
BLESSING AND THE CURSE: THE BURNING OF WIVES IN INDIA (John Stratton Hawley ed.,
1994)-
101 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The American National Interest and Global Public Goods, 78 INT'L
AFF. 233, 242 (2002).
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tional conditions for the emergence of such a United States is therefore
at the heart of the imperial executive project. 102
Recent thinking on the possibility of a Pax Americana is animated
in significant part by the highly abstract game theory model of inter-
national relations known as the theory of public goods. The theory of
public goods - readily familiar to economists - is that if a good is
nonrivalrous (consumption by one party does not preclude consump-
tion by others) and nonexclusive (its provider cannot successfully ex-
clude others from taking advantage of it), then uncoordinated rational
actors will systematically underproduce the good in question. Because
no one producer will be able to reap all of the social benefits generated
by its investments in a public good, producers will systematically fail
to invest as much as is warranted by the social benefits the good pro-
vides. Even worse, potential beneficiaries of a public good have af-
firmative incentives to hold off on investing in the good altogether in
hopes of free riding off of the efforts of other providers. 103
At the level of the nation-state, national security has long been a
classic example of a public good. National security is nonrivalrous
and nonexclusive. Each citizen has an interest in seeing that others
provide for a national security system on which she can rely without
investing in it herself.'0 4 At the transnational level, the analysis for in-
ternational security is much the same, except that no central body like
the state exists to step in and coercively require contributions for the
mutual benefit of the members. No one state stands to recoup the
global benefits to be reaped from the costly establishment of interna-
tional security. Moreover, each state would prefer (all things being
equal) to be able to rely on security provided by the investments of
others. 105
From the view afforded by the game theory model, the public
goods problem purports to explain why the world needs the United
States to act as a global hegemon to secure peace and security unilat-
erally.10 6 U.S. hegemony promises to cut through the public goods
problem by establishing a global actor whose power is so great that it
recoups enough of a benefit to warrant investments in public goods
such as global security. The public goods problem, after all, is a spe-
102 See Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 116 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=894 117.
103 See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 132-34 (ist ed. 1965).
104 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 23 (1991).
105 See Charles P. Kindleberger, International Public Goods Without International Govern-
ment, 76 AM. ECON. REV. i, 7-1i (1986).
106 See Yoo, supra note 12, at 784-87.
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cies of collective action or coordination problem, and nothing resolves
a coordination problem like unilateral action.
A number of additional observations about world politics seem to
follow from the public goods theory. According to Yoo, for example,
U.S. provision of global security explains the success of the European
Union among states with historically antagonistic traditions.10 7 (His-
torically antagonistic E.U. member states cooperate, Yoo explains, be-
cause their antagonisms are muted by an "American security guaran-
tee."108) The promise of U.S. hegemony also explains why the latest
round of proposed United Nations reforms to create a stronger Secu-
rity Council is doomed to failure; a stronger (but inevitably still collec-
tive) Security Council will only hamper the capacity of regional and
global powers to cut through collective action problems via unilateral
action. 09
For theorists of the American imperial executive, the public goods
theory of international security and the global rule of law further ex-
plain why American constitutional law - properly understood - au-
thorizes an imperial executive branch, capable of implementing a uni-
lateralist foreign policy through its ostensibly inherent and formally
unchecked constitutional foreign affairs powers.'" 0 Yoo suggests in his
book that a strong Executive is most likely to advance the nation's in-
terests in the field of international relations. "[T]he presidency," Yoo
writes, "best meets the requirements for taking rational action on be-
half of the nation in the modern world.""'1 More recently, Yoo and a
coauthor have elaborated this theory at greater length. Their formal
conclusion is that Yoo's theory of the strong executive is the best allo-
cation of power from the perspective of rational choice international
relations theory." 2
The difficulty with the public goods theory is that, stated in its
baldest form, the formal model of public goods in international secu-
rity is neither provable nor disprovable. Other nation-states, of course,
may object to U.S. actions that purport to provide global public goods.
Even in the short time since 9/11, such objections have become famil-
iar, especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. 113 But under the public
goods theory, such objections are radically discounted, for objection is
precisely what the public goods theory predicts. According to the the-
107 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 28, at 328.
108 Id.
109 See Yoo, supra note 29, at 656-60; see also Yoo & Trachman, supra note 29 (critiquing U.N.
rules on the use of force).
110 See Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 102 (arguing that a war powers system that allocates broad
powers to the Executive best advances the effectiveness of the warmaking system).
111 YOO, supra note 2o, at 20.
112 See Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 102.
113 See STEPHEN M. WALT, TAMING AMERICAN POWER 62-69 (20o5).
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ory, free-riding nation-states can be expected to feign objection so as to
avoid future obligations to contribute to international security. Objec-
tion is in their interest because it minimizes their future exposure. As
a result, not even the vociferous objection of other nation-states under-
cuts some versions of the public goods defense of U.S. hegemony. If
ever there were a theory of international relations well-designed
to support the self-justifying exercise of U.S. power around the world,
this is it. As a formal model, the public goods theory is terrifyingly
unfalsifiable. 114
This is where history comes in, and it is why the historical analogy
to the Pax Britannica has proven so important in the literature on the
new moment of American empire. The challenge for the public goods
theory is to specify when it applies and when it does not. Certain
kinds of international projects, it turns out, are especially susceptible
to collective action problems. Others are more amenable to effective
coordination and resist unilateral solutions.11 5 The difference between
the two kinds of projects often turns on institutional context, and for
just this reason, debates in international relations have long sought to
move beyond formal model-building by filling in the historical and in-
stitutional context of international relations.' 1 6
No one has more energetically pursued the historical virtues of the
British Empire than the dauntingly prolific historian Niall Ferguson.
Whereas most of the new advocates of the British imperial model offer
only a stylized version of empire, Ferguson's voluminous histories de-
scribe the empire in detail. Ferguson does not shy away from empire's
114 There is at least one piece of evidence that ought to give advocates of the public goods the-
sis some pause. Yoo tells us that the United Nations threatens to obstruct the benign hegemonic
unilateralism of the United States. See Yoo, supra note 29; Yoo & Trachman, supra note 29, at
379-86. If the world community were made up of free-riders coasting on the efforts of the United
States, the last thing we would expect them to do is to object in a forum and in a manner that
might actually work. Individual nation-state objections may be cheap talk, but collective objec-
tion in the United Nations might actually carry some weight and discourage the United States
from providing precisely the public good on which U.N. member states free-ride. Even if the
free-riding states might be expected to engage in cheap-talk protest, they should not be expected
to obstruct the provision of the public good on which they purportedly rely.
115 See GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc A. Stern eds., 1999) (discussing various global
collective action problems); TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION (2004) (describing
the variety of international public goods problems). Even critics of international law view coor-
dination questions this way. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33-37, 83-88 (2005).
116 See, e.g., G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RE-
STRAINT, AND THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS (2ooi); ROBERT 0.
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL
ECONOMY (rev. ed. 2005); ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (ic99); see also Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism
in International Law, i I9 HARV. L. REV. 1404 (2oo6) (book review).
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ugly features. He describes them in considerable detail, ranging from
the British scramble for Africa, in which resistance was simply "mown
down by the Maxim gun,"11 7 to the Boer concentration camps, to the
killing of some io,ooo Muslim enemies of the empire in a single battle
at the turn of the twentieth century, to the 1919 massacre of peaceful
protesters at the Jallianwala Bagh in what is now Indian Punjab."8
With these events close to mind, Ferguson is at pains to develop an
unvarnished argument for the British Empire, one that rests not
merely on empire's virtues but also on the vice of its alternatives.
For much of its history, Ferguson writes, "the British Empire acted
as an agency for imposing free markets, the rule of law, investor pro-
tection and relatively incorrupt government on roughly a quarter of
the world." 1 9  He is aware, of course, how contrary to the conven-
tional scholarly wisdom this kind of claim about empire has become,
and so it is with something approaching contrarian glee that Ferguson
declares that "no organization in history has done more to promote the
free movement of goods, capital and labour than the British Empire in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And no organization has
done more to impose Western norms of law, order and governance
around the world.' 20
Ferguson's reasoning rests on a counterfactual. His claim is not
that the British Empire was an unalloyed boon to mankind. Fergu-
son's argument is that the alternatives were far worse. Because the
British brought with them the common law, the idea of liberty, the in-
stitutions of democracy and the ideology of freedom, the British Em-
pire came with its own built-in set of constraints - constraints that
could be (and often were) invoked by the colonized as well as the colo-
nizers. 1 2 1 "The question," Ferguson writes, "is not whether British im-
perialism was without blemish. It was not. The question is whether
117 FERGUSON, supra note 22, at 240.
118 See id. at 223-40, 264-70, 276-82, 326-28.
119 Id. at xxiii.
120 Id. at xxiv.
121 Id. at xxv. For an excellent view of the ways in which the Empire dispersed common law
principles around the world, see MASTERS, SERVANTS, AND MAGISTRATES IN BRITAIN AND
THE EMPIRE, 1562-1955 (Douglas Hay & Paul Craven eds., 2004), which describes the expansion
of employment law throughout the British Empire. Other studies proffer the controversial con-
tention that the spread of the common law through the British Empire promoted economic devel-
opment more effectively than did the civil law spread by the British Empire's European competi-
tors. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law
and Finance, io6 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (arguing that common law countries have stronger
legal protections for investors than do those using other legal systems); see also Edward L. Glaeser
& Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002) (observing differences between
common law and civil law systems and arguing that these differences are associated with different
social and economic outcomes).
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there could have been a less bloody path to modernity." 22 Ferguson's
intuition is that there could not. It is a striking and plausible idea.
The power of Ferguson's case is readily apparent even as the objec-
tion to it is clear. Its power is that it refuses to romanticize the non-
Western alternatives to British power. Ferguson takes very seriously
the idea that the kinds of order and stability that liberal Western states
have achieved are often critical for human flourishing. To be sure, the
appeal of this idea speaks volumes about the chastened aspirations of
our Hobbesian times. Nonetheless, given the success of Western val-
ues over the past century, Ferguson's argument warrants deep respect.
The objection to Ferguson's counterfactual assessment is that by
starting the inquiry with a Western modernity to which the British
Empire helped give shape, Ferguson has loaded the dice. How else
better to arrive at the present than via the route that was in fact taken
by the past? Left out of the equation in this kind of backward-looking
story are the ways in which present arrangements undoubtedly condi-
tion and constrain our conceptions of what is possible in the world.
The reverse teleology of Ferguson's method omits the ways in which
present arrangements inevitably shape our conceptions of the good. 12 3
Ferguson's counterfactual defense of empire ultimately reduces to a
referendum on the social order of Western-dominated modernity.
Those who admire Western capitalism will find much to credit in the
British Empire. Modernity's critics will find much to fault.
Either way, for critics and defenders alike, the important point here
is that Ferguson's version of the legend of the imperial peace does not
do the work that Yoo needs it to do. There is little doubt (even if Fer-
guson's comparison of the British Empire with its non-Western com-
petitors is right) that the British Empire could have been better than it
was, that its liberty- and rule-of-law-disseminating features could have
been elevated more highly over its brutal and ravenous ones than they
were. Few of the Empire's guns at Omdurman, or its camps in the
Transvaal, or its troops in the Punjab could reasonably have been seen
as critical to the bringing of liberal values to the undeveloped world.
The British Empire, to be sure, might have been preferable to alterna-
tives such as the Japanese empire that Ferguson glimpses along the
River Kwai in Japanese-controlled Thailand during World War II.
The British Empire might better have embodied liberal principles than
the Mughal Empire that the Indian Mutiny of 1857 sought to re-
store. 124 But was the actual British Empire better than a counterfac-
122 FERGUSON, supra note 22, at xxix.
123 It is worth noting that Ferguson surely understands this point: he is the editor of a highly
sophisticated set of essays on counterfactual histories. See VIRTUAL HISTORY (Niall Ferguson
ed., 1999).
124 FERGUSON, supra note 22, at xxvi.
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tually better form of the British Empire might have been? This, after
all, is the question many critics raise with respect to U.S. power today.
Their claim is not typically that the United States is better or worse
than other powerful actors around the world, but that there might be a
better version of the United States. The question they pose is which of
several forms of American power the government ought to project
around the world.
From this perspective, Yoo's version of a constitution for the Pax
Americana hardly seems like a propitious way to reinvigorate the pro-
ject of liberal empire. Yoo's account of executive authority would
minimize the place of courts and legal processes. In Ferguson's ac-
count, however, the spread of common law institutions to the far cor-
ners of the globe appears as one of the British Empire's central vir-
tues. The logic of Ferguson's defense of the Empire might therefore
lead one to reject precisely the kinds of executive prerogative that Yoo
defends.
III. MORANT BAY AND THE LEGEND OF THE IMPERIAL PEACE
A Jurisprudence of Power, by R.W. Kostal, a legal historian at the
University of Western Ontario, is a brilliantly timed monograph on the
well-known controversy surrounding British colonial governor Ed-
ward John Eyre and martial law in Jamaica, a cause c6l bre of mid-
nineteenth-century British imperial politics. The book is apparently
unaffected by the fantasies and fictions of empire concocted by so
many in our own era. It provides a wonderful way into the actual op-
eration of the law of empire and that law's troubled place in Anglo-
American constitutionalism. Moreover, Kostal's story helps to make
sense of critical features of twenty-first-century American legal de-
bates, especially arguments for an imperial executive.
The public goods analysis and Ferguson's counterfactual thesis
leave us in something of a quandary. They offer theories sustained by
little more than a few stylized facts and a history told at a vertigi-
nously high level of abstraction. They do little to delve into the nitty-
gritty day-to-day operation of empire, nor do they tell us much about
the role that law and constitutionalism played in the British parallel to
American power. What both views could use is thicker description of
empire in practice. Kostal's book does this beautifully. It deserves a
large audience.
A. Morant Bay
On October ii, 1865, a large group of black Jamaicans mobbed the
courthouse in Morant Bay, Jamaica, in the island colony's southeast
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corner. Tensions had been building for some time. In 1833, Britain
had enacted a gradual plan to abolish slavery in Jamaica, 125 and by
the end of the 183Os, that plan had come to fruition. Over the next
few decades, poor Jamaicans suffered from what one historian has de-
scribed as "an almost biblical onslaught of plagues: cholera, smallpox,
drought and floods."'1 26 Food prices increased sharply because of the
reduced supply and increased demand touched off by civil war in the
United States. I27 Making matters worse, the colonial government had
begun a concerted campaign to clear squatters from land that planters
sought to turn to sugar production. 28 By the time Jamaicans gathered
to assault the courthouse at Morant Bay, conditions in Jamaica had led
many white British colonial officials to conclude that black Jamaicans
were incapable of developing the thrift and industriousness required in
a post-slavery market economy. The three-decades-old experiment in
emancipation seemed to many in the white planter elite to have been a
failure. 129
In the notoriously difficult conditions of post-emancipation Ja-
maica, the Morant Bay courthouse became a sore spot in relations be-
tween the white planter class and black Jamaicans. As historian
Thomas Holt puts it, "more often than not, planters were the com-
plainants and judges, while blacks were the defendants and losers.' 130
At the petty sessions of the justices of the peace, overseen by the local
white magistrate, the scales of justice too often seemed to be tipped in
favor of the planters. The planters selected the magistrates, and local
blacks came to resent the power that the magistrate's court gave to lo-
cal planters in the construction of the new, post-slavery economy. In
particular, Jamaicans increasingly chafed at the seemingly one-sided
decisions by magistrates in land cases pitting squatters or Jamaicans
claiming customary or prescriptive rights in land against white colo-
nial sugar planters. 131 A royal commission subsequently named to in-
vestigate the events of October 1865 at Morant Bay concluded that the
125 See THOMAS C. HOLT, THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM: RACE, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN
JAMAICA AND BRITAIN, 1832-1938, at 48-53 (1992).
126 Id. at 263.
127 See id. at 264-65.
128 See id. at 265.
129 See id. at 278-80; ERIC FONER, NOTHING BUT FREEDOM: EMANCIPATION AND ITS
LEGACY 27, 29-30
, 
42 (983); KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 4-5.
130 HOLT, supra note 125, at 288.
131 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 95-97; DIANA PATON, NO BOND BUT THE LAW:
PUNISHMENT, RACE, AND GENDER IN JAMAICAN STATE FORMATION, 1780-i87o, at 159-61
(2004).
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desire to obtain land and lack of confidence in the courts were two of
the most significant causes of the uprising. 132
In Morant Bay, a local preacher named Paul Bogle crystallized the
bitterness against the local magistrate. Bogle inveighed against the
magistrate and against the legal regime that turned Jamaicans off of
what many of them had come to think of as their land. 133 Tensions
boiled over in September and October 1865. Breaches of the peace at
eviction proceedings 134 led the magistrate, Baron Maximillian von
Ketelhodt (a German-born Jamaican planter whose life would surely
have made an extraordinary story if it had not turned out to be so
short), to issue arrest warrants for Bogle and several others. Bogle and
the others forcibly resisted the arrests. 135 In response, von Ketelhodt
mustered the local militia and on October i i convened a meeting of
the area's white and colored elite in the Morant Bay courthouse. That
same day, Bogle and more than 500 followers marched on the town
square, sacked the local police building, and when confronted by von
Ketelhodt and the militia, refused to disperse. 136  Shots were ex-
changed, and when von Ketelhodt and his men retreated to the court-
house, Bogle's rag-tag group set the courthouse on fire. Of those who
fled the burning courthouse, eighteen were pursued, caught, and killed
(including von Ketelhodt). 137 By the time the insurrection slowed,
Bogle's followers had killed a total of seven militiamen and twenty-
two civilians, and had injured some thirty-four others.' 38 In the days
that followed, roving groups of armed Jamaicans plundered estates
all around the Morant Bay area and killed at least two more white
planters. 139
Recriminations by the British colonial government were fierce.
Just eight years earlier, in 1857, the Sepoy Mutiny in India had put
British colonial officials on high alert for insurrection in the empire. 40
Governor Edward Eyre - who would later cite the Indian mutiny in
his defense 41 - had only 500 white troops at his disposal and faced a
132 See Arvel B. Erickson, Edward T Cardwell: Peelite, 49 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. SOC'x
1, 51 (1959);see also KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 96-97; PATON, supra note 131, at 159-61.
133 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 12.
134 For a more detailed account of the legal proceedings that touched off the uprising, see
HOLT, supra note 125, at 294-97.
135 See id. at 295-96; KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 12.
136 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 12.
137 See id. at 12-13.
138 See HOLT, supra note 125, at 299.
139 See id. at 298-99; KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 13.
140 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 205-08.
141 See id. at 35.
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population of some 400,000 black Jamaicans. 14 2 Eyre aimed to make
up in force and terror what he lacked in numbers.
On October 13, Eyre declared martial law in Surrey County, which
included Morant Bay. Over the next seven days his armed troops bru-
tally restored order in Morant Bay and its environs. In the following
weeks, even after order had been restored, Eyre and his military sub-
jected the black residents of Morant Bay to what Kostal calls "a pro-
tracted and calculated reign of terror. '143 Between 439 and 483 Jamai-
cans were shot or executed (Bogle was among those executed). 144
More than 6oo were the victims of what the Jamaica Royal Commis-
sion later called "possitively barbarous" floggings. 45 The British colo-
nial forces burned more than iooo homes and left some 4000 people
homeless.146 At least one suspected rebel rumored to be an obeahman
(or witch doctor) was beheaded. 147
Governor Eyre also ordered the arrest of a colored opposition poli-
tician named George Gordon on charges of inciting the rebellion.
Gordon was a well-known figure who frequently communicated with a
number of British liberals in London. In what would later become one
of the most controversial responses to the insurrection, Eyre had
Gordon transported into the jurisdiction in which he had declared
martial law. A military commission tried and hanged Gordon six days
after he had surrendered to authorities. 148
Soldiers and militiamen took the atmosphere of violent recrimina-
tion considerably further than even Eyre seems to have intended. A
provost-marshal named Duberry Ramsay was probably the most vi-
cious. Ramsay was named the head of a prison camp during the mar-
tial law period, and in this capacity he sadistically whipped scores of
prisoners and executed dozens summarily on the barest and flimsiest of
evidence. 14  Ramsay made possible the successful prosecution of
Gordon by inducing prisoners in his camp to testify against Gordon in
the military commission at which Gordon was tried.15 0
142 See id. at I3; 187i Jamaica Census, microformed on International Population Census Publi-
cations (Population Research Ctr., Univ. of Tex. at Austin).
143 KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 13.
144 See id.; Erickson, supra note 132, at 5i.
145 Erickson, supra note 132, at 5I (orthography in original); see also KOSTAL, supra note 23, at
13.
146 Erickson, supra note 132, at 51.
147 HOLT, supra note 125, at 302.
148 See id. at 302-05; KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 13-14.
149 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 93-94.
15o Id. at 94-95 & n.176.
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B. Morant Bay and the Legal Frame
Simply by retelling the story of Morant Bay, Kostal has successfully
undermined the most confident and stylized versions of the hegemonic
imperial peace thesis. The Morant Bay episode (like most such epi-
sodes) seems to have been forgotten by apostles of the imperial peace.
But its details have been well known to students of the British Empire
since soon after the events took place. Morant Bay stands alongside a
litany of brutal episodes in the long moment of Britain's imperial
power: the execution of hundreds and the killing of hundreds more in
the suppression of the Christmas Rebellion in Jamaica in 183;Ls' the
horrific retribution at Cawnpore and Peshawar after the Indian Mu-
tiny of 1857;152 Cecil Rhodes's unveiling of the Maxim gun in 1893 in
what would later become Rhodesia;15 3 the massacre of the Mahdi
army in the Sudan in 1898;154 the concentration camps in South Africa
in which almost 3o,ooo Boers died at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury; 55 and the massacre of passive resisters in Amritsar in 1919.156
On closer examination, even the ostensible triumphs of the liberal Brit-
ish Empire appear tarnished. Antislavery advocacy subtly legitimated
labor exploitation in English industry; the struggle against piracy often
swept broadly, categorizing as "pirates" many who were simply op-
posed to the Empire. 157 The imperial peace thesis, it turns out, is un-
comfortably close to the self-interested view avowed by the Maxim
gun-toting Rhodes himself, who famously announced: "We are the first
race in the world, and the more of the world we inhabit, the better it is
for the human race.' 58
Perhaps the most useful feature of the Morant Bay crisis is that it
puts in perspective the extent to which liberal empire achieved its os-
tensibly liberal ends. Even in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury and the beginning of the twentieth, at the height of what Fergu-
son touts as Britain's period of liberal empire, the colonial project was
as much about violent suppression as it was about the spread of law
151 See Mary Reckord, The Jamaica Slave Rebellion of 1831, 40 PAST & PRESENT io8 (1968).
152 See FERGUSON, supra note 22, at 151-52.
153 See id. at 225-26.
154 See id. at 267-68.
155 See id. at 277.
156 See id. at 326.
157 On the relationship between the antislavery movement and labor exploitation in industrial
Britain, see DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION, 1770-1823 (975). On the politics of piracy, see generally MARCUS REDIKER,
BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA: MERCHANT SEAMEN, PIRATES, AND
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MARITIME WORLD, 1700-1750 (1987); NICHOLAS TARLING,
PIRACY AND POLITICS IN THE MALAY WORLD (1963); and CARL A. TROCKI, PRINCE OF
PIRATES (1979).
158 See FERGUSON, supra note 22, at 228.
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and Western-style liberalism. Indeed, in the conventional account of
the British imperial experience (an account that Kostal's book con-
firms), Morant Bay and its aftermath helped to undo the liberal ex-
periment in emancipation and self-government in the colonies, replac-
ing a short-lived empire of free labor with one based squarely on the
racial subordination of non-white colonies to the white European em-
pire. It was a short step from Morant Bay to Conrad's Heart of Dark-
ness, to Kipling's white man's burden, and to the long list of abuses
in the race-based empire of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. 159
Kostal's book is far more, however, than merely a recitation of the
terror and brutality that accompanied empire. What Kostal has done
is trace the constitutional culture that Hulsebosch describes in the
British Empire of the eighteenth century into the second British Em-
pire a century later. Over the weeks and months that followed the
suppression of the rebellion, debate swelled in Britain over the propri-
ety of Eyre's actions and those of the soldiers under his command.
Within weeks of the first reports of insurrection, public opinion in
England began to turn against Governor Eyre.1 60 The leading lights
of mid-nineteenth century Britain began to line up for or against Eyre.
John Bright, John Stuart Mill, T.H. Huxley, and Charles Darwin
counted themselves among Eyre's fiercest critics. Thomas Carlyle,
John Ruskin, and the scientist John Tyndall were among his strongest
supporters.1 61 Kostal's book is an account of the debates that ensued.
The Jamaica debate might plausibly have taken place in any num-
ber of discursive dimensions. The controversy might have touched off
a moral or ethical debate. It might have set off a debate carried on in
the terms of religious or humanitarian obligation. (The antislavery de-
bate in England had largely been carried on in these terms just a few
decades earlier. 162) It might have been a debate about the fate of the
Empire and the possibility of what twenty-first-century Americans
anxiously describe as "imperial overstretch. '1 63  The controversy in
Britain about Morant Bay might have led to a debate about race, and
in significant part it did precisely that. It might have produced a po-
litical debate about Lord John Russell's Liberal government as well,
and here again, in significant part, it did. Colonial Secretary Edward
159 See HOLT, supra note 125, at 307-08; PORTER, supra note 2, at 53-54; Thomas C. Holt,
The Essence of the Contract, in FREDERICK COOPER, THOMAS C. HOLT, & REBECCA J.
SCOTT, BEYOND SLAVERY: EXPLORATIONS OF RACE, LABOR, AND CITIZENSHIP IN
POSTEMANCIPATION SOCIETIES 33 (20oo).
160 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 14-15.
161 See id. at i5, 154-55, 187-89.
162 See DAVIS, supra note 157; Thomas Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitar-
ian Sensibility (pts. I & 2), 9o AM. HIST. REV. 339, 547 (i985).
163 The term was coined in the i98os by Paul Kennedy. See KENNEDY, supra note ii, at 515.
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Cardwell quickly suspended Eyre as governor and appointed his re-
placement to head a royal commission to investigate the episode.
Kostal's central observation is that law talk - the discourse of le-
gality and constitutions - saturated the Morant Bay controversy. The
Jamaica debate became first and foremost a legal and constitutional
debate. Not one speaker in all of the controversy, Kostal observes,
seems to have condemned Eyre for having sinned. (Sin had been the
slaveholders' error just a few decades before, and many of Eyre's
fiercest critics were Christian missionaries and former abolitionists. 64)
The problem in the view of Eyre's critics was not that Eyre and his
officers had committed sins, but that they had committed crimes. In
turn, Eyre's supporters defended his actions in similarly legal terms:
they insisted he had followed the law.165 As Kostal puts it, the central
players in the Jamaica controversy talked and acted according to a set
of "deeply ingrained habits of mind"; virtually all of them "saw the
world through the prism of law."'1 66
In December 1865, liberals such as Bright and Mill established an
ad hoc group known as the Jamaica Committee, whose central goal
was to establish that the protections of the British constitution and of
British law extended even to the most distant parts of the Empire.
Their mission, as Kostal writes, was to establish that "civilian and
military agents of the Crown were always and everywhere legally ac-
countable for their official acts, even when those acts took place under
a proclamation of 'martial law.""' 167 (Mill, in particular, seems to have
been committed to the idea of pursuing a legal judgment on the Eyre
controversy in the courts.) Accordingly, the Jamaica Committee re-
tained two distinguished barristers, one a Queen's Counsel, to draft an
opinion on the illegality of Eyre's conduct. With the opinion in hand,
the Committee pushed the government to initiate a criminal prosecu-
tion of Eyre.' 68 When the new Conservative government declined to
do so (and when Disraeli went so far as to suggest that Eyre had acted
appropriately under the circumstances), the Committee began two pri-
vate criminal prosecutions of Eyre and a third against two military of-
ficers who had sentenced George Gordon to death: Colonel Abercrom-
bie Nelson and Lieutenant Herbert Brand. 169 For good measure, the
Committee sponsored a private civil suit against Eyre by two Jamai-
164 DAVIS, supra note 157; KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 134.
165 KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 45.
166 Id. at 128.
167 Id. at 15.
168 See id. at 49-52.
169 See id. at i5-16.
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cans seeking damages for injuries they had suffered during the period
of martial law.
1 70
Kostal plausibly contends that "the Jamaica Committee succeeded
in provoking the most protracted and significant public discussion of
the idea of the rule of law during the Victorian era."1 7 1 In turn, the af-
fair revealed "the deep penetration into public discourse of legal terms,
criteria, and concepts."'17 2  Law and constitutionality became the
measures of propriety in the British Empire, and in the process law
and legality became. the language in which the Jamaica controversy
played itself out. Eyre's critics described his errors not in terms of
their immorality (though they agreed Eyre's acts were immoral), but in
terms of their illegality and inconsistency with the British constitution.
Their aim was to force the government to "uphold constitutional
law"'17 3 in the Empire and to "vindicate the majesty of British law.' 7 4
As Kostal tells the story, lawyers and law seem to have been eve-
rywhere. A battery of British barristers descended on Jamaica in Jan-
uary 1866 to investigate the uprising and its aftermath. 175 Eyre's Co-
lonial Office replacement, Henry Storks, identified the failure "to abide
by the laws" as the chief source of the troubles at Morant Bay.
7 6
(Storks initiated local Jamaican-court prosecutions against participants
in the uprising and against white officials accused of excesses during
the period of martial law.' 77 ) Publications proliferated in the legal
press regarding the legal questions arising out of the episode. One le-
gal writer, W.F. Finlason, alone produced no fewer than five treatises
on martial law in the years immediately following Morant Bay, and
partisans on all sides produced a mountain of pamphlets on the sig-
nificance of martial law in British constitutionalism. 7 8 Lord Chief
Justice Alexander Cockburn and Sir Colin Blackburn - perhaps the
two leading judges in Britain - issued widely reprinted grand jury in,-
structions in cases arising out of the controversy: Cockburn in the
prosecution of Nelson and Brand, and Blackburn in the prosecution of
Eyre himself. Newspapers and the popular press carried on extended
170 See id. at 432-33.
171 Id. at i6.
172 Id. at 18.
173 Id. at 36 (quoting DAILY NEWS (LONDON), Dec. 2, 1865, at 2) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
174 Id. at 37 (quoting DAILY NEWS (LONDON), Dec. 6, 1865, at 2) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
175 Id. at 73-78.
176 Id. at 71 (quoting TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 29, 1866, at 6) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
177 Id. at 70. Tellingly, the former prosecutions were successful, but the latter were not. Mili-
tary prosecutions of British officials in courts martial also failed. Id. at i19.
178 Id. at 194-95, 209-28, 256.
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debates on the constitutional questions raised by Eyre's conduct, all
the while reporting avidly on each new development in the Jamaica
Committee's legal proceedings.
The deep penetration of law talk into the debates on the Morant
Bay affair made law, in Kostal's words, the "forum for the negotiation
of the basic terms of political power" in the Jamaica debate. 179 As
Kostal puts it, "the country turned to lawyers and judges to accom-
plish what had not been accomplished by politicians: to reconcile the
nation's conflicting passions for legality and imperial dominion."18 0
It is worth considering the significance of this turn to law, not the
least for the light it may shed on the turn to law in our own moment of
empire. What did it matter that law - not religion, not politics, not
ethics - became the conversational vehicle for discussions in Britain
over the relationship between morality and imperial power? Kostal
contends that the turn to legality produced an "English moral imagina-
tion" that was dominated by questions of law, a moral imagination
that functioned as "a legal imagination."18 1 But what exactly is the
meaning of such a turn to law and legality?
What Kostal seems to mean is that the legal frame offered a way of
talking about the Jamaica problem that would bring the conversation-
alists together on a field with a shared set of values and ground rules.
Debates about the law helped to establish, in terms that Martha Mi-
now has suggested,"8 2 a shared way of speaking that linked speakers
and their audiences to the past of the British constitution as well as to
its future. It created "positions from which and audiences to which"
those who sought to speak out on the Jamaica episode might address
themselves.18 3 The "medium" of the law, as Milner Ball has called it,
might give shape to the claims of the contending parties in such a way
as to confer significance on the positions of all sides; law might func-
tion as a "medium for responsible human intercourse," 1 4 a medium
that could "keep conversation, negotiation, argument, dialogue, and
conflict going"18S even in a community divided by sharp controversy.
The great virtue of law, it seemed, was its capacity to constitute and
reconstitute the British constitutional community even as it provided a
mechanism for articulating differences within that community. Law,
as James Boyd White has written of the modern American system,
gives shape to the very relationships that define what is at contro-
179 Id. at 464.
180 Id. at 478.
181 Id. at 463.
182 See Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights, 96 YALE L.J. 186o, 1865 (1987).
183 JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 266 (1984).
184 MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER 33 (1985).
185 Id. at 31.
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versy.1 86 The discourse of the law in Victorian Britain thus became
both a way of talking about the controversy - a shared way of speak-
ing - and a way of shaping it. In the Jamaica episode, the recourse to
law helped to define both the contours of the controversy and the
community in which the controversy arose.
Law talk may produce and reproduce community. But the conse-
quences of law talk are more extensive still. Legal discourse produces
a particular form of community. The choice to engage in law talk is
the choice to engage in a kind of discourse with its own internal moral-
ity - a morality that rests on reason and that entails the dignity of the
individuals who make claims on it.18 7
The internal morality of legal and constitutional debate over em-
pire helps to explain the significance of that debate from at least
Hulsebosch's eighteenth century to the present day. Ferguson, too,
would recognize the cardinal virtues of the liberal British Empire in
the legal debate over the Jamaica uprising and its suppression. For
Kostal, Hulsebosch, and Ferguson alike, the importance of law talk
serves as a kind of testament to the significance of law and of rule-of-
law values in the Empire, even in some of its most fraught situations.
It is the authority of law talk that Yoo's book and the arguments for
unfettered executive power have called into question in our own time.
IV. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION
As in Kostal's Victorian crisis and Hulsebosch's eighteenth-century
imperial constitution before it, questions of law and constitutionalism
saturate debates over the current American imperial moment. Con-
troversies over the use of force in places like Afghanistan and Iraq,
over the detention facility in Guantd.namo Bay, and over the rendition
of terrorism suspects to foreign states where torture is used have been
carried on in the language of the law and have given privileged space
to courts and lawyers. The legal frame that Kostal and Hulsebosch
describe in the English empire is still our frame a century and a half
after Morant Bay. 188
The similarities between debates over empire in mid-nineteenth-
century England, on one hand, and over the global power of the
United States in the early twenty-first century, on the other, are quite
striking. Both use legal framework and a distinctively legal language,
186 See WHITE, supra note 183, at 273.
187 See id.; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630 (1958); Frank Michelman, Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, ioo HARV. L. REV. 4, 43 (1986).
188 See Benjamin Wittes, Judicial Baby-Splitting and the Failure of the Political Branches, in
TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY
COMBATANT CASES IO (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005).
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with all that the legal frame entails. Victorian jurists engaged in the
same mix of arguments from constitutional principle and national
strategy. Nineteenth-century advocates of an imperial executive -
like their counterparts today - contended that constitutional doctrine
favored precisely the strong Crown powers that Britain needed in its
moment of imperial peril. Those who counseled restraint insisted that
constitutional law required the very limits on martial law that would
best advance Britain's international reputation and interests. 18 9
Indeed, the two debates even share many of the same terms and
categories. Among the most striking features of Kostal's account for
the twenty-first-century American reader is the readily recognizable
taxonomy of nineteenth-century British legal and constitutional de-
bate. In critical respects, British constitutional debate of more than a
century ago foreshadowed the contours of debates that have surfaced
in the United States since 9/I.
Just as in current debates, the relationships among the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches played a central role in Victorian de-
bates over empire. In the legal profession and in the popular press
alike, the relationship between Parliament and the Crown in particular
became a central focus of discussion, especially insofar as it related to
power in the colonies. 190 The Jamaica Committee insisted that judicial
oversight of executive power was a critical feature of the British con-
stitutional tradition and that Disraeli and the Conservative govern-
ment of Lord Derby had advanced a dangerous new theory of "Execu-
tive Government.' 19 ' For their part, Eyre and a cadre of conservative
jurists insisted that the executive branch retained an inherent emer-
gency authority that was virtually unreviewable by the courts. All
sides weighed in on the relationship between Parliament's power and
the executive authority of the Crown in the colonies.
Debate in Victorian constitutionalism also swirled around the mo-
ments of exception in the legal regime. Like observers of twenty-first-
century American law, 92 many in i86os Britain contended that British
189 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 253 (noting Harrison's strategic reason to extend equal rights
to colonized peoples lest they rise up with the ferocity of the savages they are); see also id. at 468
(discussing damage to the international prestige of Great Britain as a nation that upholds the rule
of law); id. at 334-35 (reporting Cockburn's description of the advocates of Crown power "in its
most summary and terrible form" and their view that it is "indispensable" in the modern statecraft
of empire).
190 See, e.g., One of Those Curious Questions Which Carry Us Far, TIMES (LONDON), June 6,
1867, at Io-ii.
191 KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 176.
192 See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitu-
tional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); see also Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113
YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accomodating Emergencies, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME, supra note 17, at 55; Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of
Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME, supra note 17, at 39-54.
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law ought to possess emergency suspension mechanisms that would
create periods of exceptional, extralegal authority. The Jamaica Com-
mittee and its barristers, as well as jurists such as Lord Chief Justice
Cockburn, countered that there were no emergency exceptions in Brit-
ish constitutionalism. (Their argument anticipated A.V. Dicey's thirty
years later. 193 ) In this latter view, as in the view of many American ju-
rists today, the British constitution and the common law system incor-
porated flexible response mechanisms internal to the law. Emergencies
invoked these internal devices rather than triggering suspensions of the
general constitutional and common law regime.1 9 4
As in our own time, the parties involved in Victorian constitutional
debate also took up sides on questions about what Edmund Burke al-
most a century before had called "geographic morality."'19s The Bush
Administration has held prisoners at the well-known detention center
in Guantdnamo Bay and at shadowy prison centers in Eastern Europe,
Djibouti, Afghanistan, and perhaps elsewhere. 1 96 It has done so in an
effort to take advantage of what, echoing Burke, we might call a kind
of geographic legality. Distance from the mainland United States was
designed to allow the Executive to evade what it thought (on the ad-
vice of Yoo and his colleagues) might be higher levels of judicial scru-
tiny in cases involving prisoners held in the United States. Nine-
teenth-century British jurists, too, sought to invoke the distance
between Britain and the colonies as grounds for limiting the reach
of the British common law and constitutional traditions. They de-
fended what Kostal describes as "a limited imperial exception to the
principle of universal legal accountability"' 97 under the common law.
In Great Britain itself, jurists argued, martial law might be unavail-
able to the Crown, but in the far-flung reaches of the empire it was
indispensable. 198
The notion of geographic legality responded directly to the fear ex-
pressed by many in England in the i86os that martial law in the colo-
nies would act as an entering wedge for martial law in England itself.
For many, martial law in England seemed no small risk in the 186os.
Just as American civil liberties groups have warned that broad execu-
tive powers in foreign affairs risk seeping homeward, so too did the
British government's actions in Jamaica seem to be echoed in episodes
193 See DICEY, supra n6te 16, at 287-94.
194 See id.
195 See DIRKS, supra note 2, at 196.
196 AMNESTY INT'L, BELOW THE RADAR: SECRET FLIGHTS TO TORTURE AND "DISAP-
PEARANCE" (2OO6), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr5 I05 12oo6.
197 KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 256.
198 The parallel move in American constitutional law is found in the Insular Cases. See Chris-
tina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV 797 (2005).
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such as the arrests of suffrage protesters in Hyde Park in June i866, as
well as in the distinct possibility of martial law in Ireland in response
to nationalist unrest. 199
Victorian debates over martial law at Morant Bay even featured a
character to play the part of John Yoo. English barrister W.F. Fin-
lason emerged soon after the Morant Bay uprising as a leading author-
ity on martial law. In i866 he published the first of what ultimately
became five books on the topic, titled simply A Treatise on Martial
Law. 20Q Finlason was Yoo's match in prolificness, though Yoo is con-
siderably smoother as a writer and logician than Finlason ever was.
(Finlason's strategy aimed not so much to persuade his readers as to
beat them into submission by relentless prose in a never-ending flood
of publications.) Finlason's work on the executive power in the British
empire, like Yoo's, launched its author from relative obscurity into a
storm of controversy.
Both men's ideas rest in significant part on a realist theory of in-
ternational relations and a deep sense that power is the only language
that counts in an anarchic world. 2° 1 Finlason, like Yoo, was energized
by what he saw as deep flaws in a conventional wisdom that seemed
overly idealistic (Finlason ultimately came to call these flaws hypocri-
sies). Not surprisingly, Finlason's work, much like Yoo's, was roundly
condemned by the author's political opponents. 20 2 Yet if Finlason's
experience is any guide, Yoo's work may have a lasting impact on the
law of foreign affairs. An opinion joined by four Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court cited Finlason as an authority on martial law just this
past Term in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.203
Kostal seems to disclose his view of twenty-first-century debates
over the law of empire when he says that Finlason's work amounted
to "a series of elaborate legal justifications for the ready and ruthless
use of terror in the empire. '20 4 Finlason became the most prominent
defender of a broad power of martial law in the colonies and of the
Crown's inherent authority to invoke it. He aimed to establish three
propositions. The first was that the suppression of insurrection in the
colonies was a form of warfare, and that this conferred on the Crown
and its military all of the authority associated with wartime. Finlason
argued, second, that the full war powers of the Crown were indispen-
sable in the fight against the savages at the periphery of the empire.
At the very beginnings of the much-touted period of Britain's liberal
199 KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 162-63, 251.
200 W.F. FINLASON, A TREATISE ON MARTIAL LAW (London, Stevens & Sons x866).
201 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 481; YOO, supra note 20.
202 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 244-45.
203 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2783 (2oo6) (plurality opinion).
204 KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 229.
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empire, Finlason announced that martial law would be needed with
ever greater urgency to control the savage races that populated Brit-
ain's "widespread dominions. '20 s Finlason insisted that these two ob-
servations led inevitably to a third: Governor Eyre had supervened no
legal limits in the Jamaica controversy. Eyre had merely executed the
wartime authority of the Crown to put down a colonial insurrection.
The empire, Finlason suggested, could not survive without extending
this kind of authority to its officers.2 0 6
For all the parallels between Finlason's views and the strong execu-
tive position today, Finlason's propositions are at least as interesting
for what they failed to include. There is at least one noticeable differ-
ence between the discourse of Anglo-American constitutional debate in
1865 and the language of the law today. The universe of possible legal
moves has become larger; the law's boundaries have stretched to ac-
commodate new and more polarized positions made available by the
distinctive structure of U.S. constitutionalism. Unlike the British min-
isterial system, of course, the U.S. constitutional system creates an ex-
ecutive branch that is structurally independent of the legislative
branch. Moreover, in the United States, courts have long claimed a
power that by the nineteenth century was unavailable to their coun-
terparts in the British system of parliamentary sovereignty: the power
to review acts of Congress for constitutional violations. The result in
the United States has been a radically more divergent constitutional
discourse on important questions about law and global power.
Yoo and his colleagues have pushed out the rightward bounds of
the debate over executive power in Anglo-American constitutional law.
At no point during the Jamaica controversy of the i86os did anyone
suggest that Crown officials in the colonies (and certainly not Crown
officials in the metropole) might not be legally bound by acts of Par-
liament. To be sure, Jamaica Committee partisans accused Disraeli
and Lord Derby's Conservative government of secretly supporting a
dangerous new theory of executive power.207 But nothing from the
Derby government approached the claims made on behalf of the impe-
rial executive in twenty-first-century American constitutionalism. This
kind of unilateral executive authority was simply outside the horizons
of a British constitutional debate that focused on the inherent powers
of the executive branch only insofar as it was operating in what
American specialists might now think of as Justice Jackson's second
tier of executive authority: questions as to which the legislature had
205 Id. at 231 (quoting FINLASON, supra note 200, at v).
206 See id. at 231-32.
207 See id. at 176.
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not yet acted.2 0 8 Virtually everyone agreed, for example, that Parlia-
ment had plenary authority over the governance and discipline of the
British army. 0 9
Even as the Right has moved the boundaries of American constitu-
tional debate, the Left has done the same in the opposite direction,
pushing out the left side of the constitutional universe. The Jamaica
Committee, as Kostal notes, believed deeply in the importance of judi-
cially announced standards for the thorny questions of the law of em-
pire.21 0 Committee members doggedly sought judicial determinations
on the conduct of Eyre and his subordinates. They had what Kostal
calls "an unflagging faith" in a court-centered theory of the British law
of empire. 211 But one searches in vain through the Jamaica Commit-
tee's voluminous publications for the position adopted by American
liberals that courts ought in the name of constitutional rights to strike
down certain procedures authorized by the legislative branch. The
British system of parliamentary sovereignty simply did not permit this
move. Even the great liberal statement of the law of empire in Lord
Chief Justice Cockburn's grand jury charge conceded that Parliament
could institute martial law anywhere in the Empire, even in the heart
of England.1 2 Indeed, the Lord Chief Justice observed more than
once that the problem of martial law in the colonies was "one that
ought to receive legislative solution. '21 3 As one critic of Eyre put it in
January 1866, the proposition that liberals sought to vindicate was not
that the British constitution prohibited military court jurisdiction over
British subjects, but that military courts had no jurisdiction over Brit-
ish subjects "without an express Act of the Legislature. ''214
Along both of these dimensions - executive power for Yoo and ju-
dicial power for twenty-first-century American liberals - the bounds
of the Anglo-American law of empire have grown further apart. (This
is one of the reasons that torture, which around the time of the Morant
208 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-37 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
209 See, e.g., CHARGE OF THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND TO THE GRAND JURY
AT THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT IN THE CASE OF THE QUEEN AGAINST NELSON AND
BRAND 67 (Frederick Cockburn ed., London, William Ridgway 1867) [hereinafter CHARGE OF
THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE].
210 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 19.
211 Id.
212 See id. at 329.
213 CHARGE OF THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 2o9, at 21.
214 KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 211-12 (quoting SOLICITORS' JOURNAL & REPORTER 198
(1866)) (internal quotation mark omitted). Finlason's position was merely that "the constitution
has vested in the Sovereign the right to resort to [martial law] without legislative sanction." Id. at
244 (alteration in original) (quoting 41 L. TIMES 762-63 (1866)).
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Bay controversy had been relegated to the realm of mere historical in-
terest, has reentered the legal landscape.' 1 5 )
For all their differences, nineteenth-century British jurists shared
among themselves a wide range of values and assumptions about Brit-
ish law in the Empire. More often than not they seem to have agreed
with one another. Finlason on the Right and the Jamaica Committee
on the Left both recognized that Parliament had the power to proclaim
martial law and that the Crown had the authority to suspend the
common law in the face of emergency. Moreover, virtually everyone in
the debate shared the view that so long as Eyre and his officers had
subjectively believed that their actions were a reasonable response to
the circumstances, they had acted within the law, regardless of
whether their beliefs had been objectively reasonable.2 16 For all of its
abstract rhetoric about the limits on the Crown and the importance of
the common law in the colonies, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn's grand
jury charge in the Nelson and Brand case boiled down to asking the
grand jury whether Eyre and his officers had acted in the good faith
belief that their actions were required to suppress the insurrection.
Though it was often difficult to remember, Lord Chief Justice Cock-
burn, Justice Blackburn, and Finlason actually agreed on this point 72 1
Even Finlason was committed to a version of the rule of law in
empire that preserved judicial power to sanction unreasonable bad-
faith responses by Crown officials to imperial exigencies. Courts, on
Finlason's account, would hold the military to "those rules of common
justice and humanity, which are universally obligatory, which are in-
dependent of all positive laws. ' '21 8 Finlason conceded that the com-
mon law extended throughout the Empire, but he insisted that it re-
laxed its standards as it approached the outer reaches of the imperial
dominions and as it encompassed "alien races. '21 9  Opponents of
Finlason such as Fitzjames Stephen and the Jamaica Committee
agreed that the common law extended throughout the Empire; they
merely embedded in the common law a public necessity doctrine for
215 See generally Waldron, supra note 31, at 1683-84.
216 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 338, 408.
217 See id. at 352, 408.
218 See id. at 482 (quoting FINLASON, supra note 200, at 84) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Finlason's standard for military courts looks remarkably like the standard adopted several
decades later by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Insular Cases, see, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244 (1900), for determining those elements of the U.S. Constitution that applied in the terri-
tories acquired in the Spanish-American War. See Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall,
Between the Foreign and the Domestic: The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and
Reinvented, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION,
AND THE CONSTITUTION I, 8-9 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke.Marshall eds., 2001). I am
unable to locate any reference to Finlason's rule in the Insular Cases themselves or in the briefs.
219 KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 481-82 (quoting W.F. FINLASON, JUSTICE TO A COLONIAL
GOVERNOR 130 (London, Chapman & Hall 1869)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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times of emergency.2 20 Whether these positions in the end were differ-
ent from one another in any concrete sense was as unclear then as it is
now. What is clear is that whatever the legal differences, virtually
everyone in the legal debates recognized some legal constraints in the
Empire, but also sought to provide colonial officials the power neces-
sary to maintain the Empire, even if it could only be preserved by vig-
orous force.2 2 1
By comparison, the disagreements in twenty-first-century American
constitutional debate are far sharper. Finlason's rule would have insu-
lated British colonial officials from legal consequences for their actions
under martial law only if they acted in good faith; on his account,
courts retained jurisdiction to make those good faith determinations. 2 2
Yoo's approach to the executive power in foreign affairs, by contrast,
practically eviscerates all of the legal constraints on executive actions.
Allied positions of the io9 th Congress and the Bush Administration
purport to divest courts of the jurisdiction to review executive actions
in the sphere of foreign affairs.22 3
The implications of this polarization are quite unsettling. Kostal
suggests, as we have seen, that the legal frame in nineteenth-century
Britain was not so much a set of substantive answers to the questions
raised by empire as it was a forum in which debate about empire took
place. The law functioned not as a body of rules or commands, but
rather as a stock of discursive moves available to the contending par-
ties in the debate over empire. Law created the linguistic field on
which the differing sides debated the Empire. Yet for all their agree-
ment, for all their shared premises, it was not always clear that the le-
gal frame could give meaningful shape to their arguments. As the Ja-
maica episode wound down in i868 and 1869, the law's ability to
connect rather than disconnect, its power to enhance dialogue and
keep conversations open, seemed to wane. Legal arguments began to
spill over into political and ideological ones as lawyers and jurists ac-
cused one another of advancing ideological agendas rather than articu-
lating legal rules.22 4 Notwithstanding widely shared premises and
common doctrinal understandings, legal argument in the British Em-
pire threatened to spin out of control.
If this is so, then what are we to make of the sharply more polar-
ized frame of our own time? Few communities are more closely de-
fined by their legal and constitutional schemes than the United States;
220 Id. at 480, 482.
221 See id. at 482-84.
222 See id. at 236-37 (describing Finlason's limits on executive authority under martial law).
223 See, e.g., Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 26oo, 2635-36
(2oo6) (Westlaw).
224 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 422-23, 430-31; cf. BALL, supra note 184, at 122.
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indeed, American nationhood is largely a legal and constitutional crea-
ture.2 2 5 But our legal frame seems considerably less capable than its
predecessor in Britain of establishing shared ground and shaping de-
bates about the character of U.S. conduct in the world.
V. THE 9/I I CONSTITUTION AND
THE CRISIS OF THE LEGAL FRAME
The imperial executive has been controversial at least in part be-
cause of the threat it seems to pose to the law's ability to serve as the
medium for conversation about Anglo-American empire. Victorian
empire sought to turn its biggest questions into legal and judicial ones.
Elements in the current Administration - Vice President Cheney, his
counsel David Addington, and John Yoo chief among them, apparently
- have sought to cut courts and judges out of the picture, reserving
for unilateral executive determination many of the very same questions
that Victorian empire allocated to judges. Many in the American legal
profession have sought to characterize this imperial executive position
as outside the bounds of reasonable legal discourse. The American
Bar Association and prominent local bar associations have taken un-
characteristically strong positions against the unilateral executive.2 2 6
Some have even described Yoo's memoranda for the White House as
outside the bounds of professional competence.2 27
If positions as radical as Yoo's are available moves within the law
of foreign affairs, the critics seem to reason, what kind of constraints
can the legal frame be said to impose? The legal frame risks losing its
power to impose a set of common boundaries and terms in the conver-
sations about foreign affairs; it risks losing its remarkable capacity
to reaffirm shared community values even as it arbitrates among our
differences.
This is the polarized and fractured constitutional universe that the
Supreme Court of the United States has encountered since 2004 in its
post-9/iI terrorism cases. On one hand, the Administration has
pushed the Court to adopt a constitutional scheme that looks much
like the one that Yoo describes: a regime of broad executive powers,
225 See JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF
AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming 2007).
226 See Am. Bar Ass'n et al., Report to the House of Delegates (Aug. 9, 2004), reprinted in THE
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 46, at 1132.
227 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
641, 654-55 (2oo5); Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June
25, 2004, at A14. For a defense of Xoo as working within the professional mainstream, see Eric
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Op-Ed., A 'Torture' Memo and Its Tortuous Critics, WALL ST. J., July
6, 2004, at A22; see also Sunstein, supra note 31, at 23-24 (describing Yoo's book as flawed but
nonetheless lawyerly).
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unobstructed by either congressional enactment or international law. 28
This would be a regime located on the right edge of the universe of
available constitutional moves in the American system - a space that
did not exist in the regime in which Kostal's barristers and jurists
joined issue over the Morant Bay controversy. On the other hand, the
Administration's critics have urged the Court to articulate constitu-
tional principles that would trump both the Executive and the Con-
gress.2129 If it were to do so, the Court would locate itself in yet an-
other space unavailable to the jurists of Victorian empire.
So far, the Court has declined the invitations from both the Right
and the Left. With respect to the former, the position of an ever-
narrowing majority of the Court has been clear: the strongest claims of
executive authority advanced by Yoo are wrong as a matter of consti-
tutional law. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court rejected the Admini-
stration's claim that courts have no authority to review executive
branch detentions of U.S. citizens captured in combat zones; the Court
even rejected the Administration's fallback position that courts could
review only the question of whether there is "some evidence" to sustain
the detention at issue.23 0 In Rasul v. Bush, the Court established a ju-
dicial beachhead for the review of executive detentions of aliens in
Guantanamo Bay, and perhaps even around the world.231 And in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court rejected the Executive's interpretation
of the Detainee Treatment Act 232 as precluding judicial review of the
claims of terrorism detainees at Guantanamo. 2 33 The Hamdan Court
declined to defer to ongoing proceedings in the Executive's military
tribunals and ruled those military tribunals illegal.2 34
To the Bush Administration's critics on the Left, however, the
Court has offered a thin gruel, largely declining invitations to issue
sweeping rulings or to articulate bold new constitutional principles
about individual rights and liberties. The Hamdi Court declined to
228 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents at 41-46, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (Nos. 03-
334, 03-343).
229 See, e.g., Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 5-12, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. o3-6696).
230 See 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2644-45, 2648, 2651 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2650 ("[It would
turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his
way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his government, simply be-
cause the Executive opposes making available such a challenge."); cf. id. at 2659 (Souter, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (noting the "weakness of the
Government's mixed claim of inherent, extrastatutory authority under a combination of Article I1
of the Constitution and the usages of war").
231 See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2696-97.
232 Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§2ooodd to
2ooodd-i).
233 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2 762-69 (2oo6).
234 See id. at 2786-98.
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reject the strong executive power theory of the right to detain terror-
ism suspects and dismissed out of hand the application of full criminal
procedure protections to the hearings of terrorism detainees.23 5  In Ra-
sul, the Court said little about the due process rights of alien detain-
ees.13 6  In Hamdan, the Court once again declined to issue a broad
constitutional holding. Hamdan rests exclusively on statutes, which
Congress is free to amend or repeal. 237  Indeed, Congress appears to
have done just this in the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
What the Court has done in its post-9/Ii terrorism cases is rein in
the outliers in the constitutional controversy over the new American
empire. Indeed, in the first few years of its post-9/ii jurisprudence,
the Court has patched together something approximating the bounda-
ries of the Anglo-American constitutional universe circa 1865, when
British jurists struggled to locate the Morant Bay controversy in the
system of British constitutionalism.
For now, the strategy has largely worked as far as the Court's repu-
tation is concerned. American courts have so far fared much better in
the realm of institutional credibility than their English predecessors
did. The Morant Bay controversy set off a bitter judicial row between
two of the Empire's leading judges.2 38 Lord Chief Justice Cockburn's
grandiose, five-hour grand jury charge in the case of Nelson and
Brand quickly became a source of ridicule.2 39 The Cockburn charge,
its critics rightly noted, was "utterly indeterminate and indecisive; it
laid nothing down clearly."240  Indeed, Cockburn's grand jury asked
plaintively at the close of their service that if only for the sake of fu-
ture jurors, "martial law should be more clearly defined by legislative
enactment. ' 24 1 The Times concluded that the meaning of martial law
had become a "muddle. '242 The U.S. Supreme Court, by contrast, has
235 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639 (plurality opinion) ("We do not reach the question whether
Article II provides such authority . ); id. at 2649 (listing permissible deviations from ordinary
criminal procedure).
236 The Court went only so far as to say that the petitioner-detainees' petitions described viola-
tions of U.S. law. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698 n.I5. The Court may have meant to suggest further
that the petitions described a violation of the Constitution. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding
Significance of Law in Foreign Relations, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. I ii, 146-47.
237 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (clarifying that Congress may grant
the President "the authority he believes necessary").
238 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 407-12.
239 See id. at 345-46, 365-69. Cockburn seems to have learned his lesson; he later ruled against
the civil suit plaintiffs in the damages action sponsored by the Jamaica Committee against Eyre.
Id. at 441-43.
240 Id. at 349 (quoting W.F. FINLASON, COMMENTARIES UPON MARTIAL LAW 23 (London,
Stevens & Sons 1867)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
241 Id. at 341 (quoting The Jamaica Prosecutions, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Apr. ii,
1867, at 3) (internal quotation mark omitted).
242 Id. at 430.
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managed so far to sustain what had seemed to be a vanishing middle
ground, and it has done so to considerable praise from the legal profes-
sion and many commentators.
Yet the British example described by Kostal suggests that the
Court's success may be limited. The Morant Bay episode points to the
limits as well as the promise of the legal frame. In the end, not one of
the Jamaica Committee's suits was successful. The private criminal
prosecutions failed to get past the grand jury stage (one failed even to
get that far), and the civil suit the Committee sponsored failed as well.
The high court judiciary, "that most venerated of English law-making
institutions," Kostal writes, had failed to "furnish a coherent resolution
to the problem" of the law in empire. 43 All the legal controversy had
made clear, as the editor of one newspaper put it, was that "the minds
of judges work under the same advantages and disadvantages as do
the minds of all other intelligent men. '244
As in the eighteenth-century law of empire described by Hulse-
bosch, the legal frame does not seem to have accomplished much at all
in the Morant Bay controversy. Leading English jurists had split
badly on the meaning of martial law, and they had (as Kostal notes)
divided "on more or less the same grounds as the politicians."2 45 In the
end, the legal frame thus appears not to have reshaped the conversa-
tion about empire. Rather, the legal frame seems merely to have re-
produced the partisan controversy over martial law, now thinly dis-
guised as disagreement about law rather than disagreement about
politics or values. In the process, the significance and value of the le-
gal frame came into question. As the Manchester Guardian put it,
lawyers and jurists seemed to "differ as widely as other men in the
moral medium through which they regard the facts. '246
Worse still, the legal frame may even have diverted British colonial
officials and jurists from the troublesome issues at the heart of Ja-
maica's difficulties. The troubled political economy of post-emancipa-
tion Jamaica was sapping the strength of the recently freed people of
the colony. Sugar production had fallen dramatically. White planters
sought to increase the supply of wage labor even as they had precious
few jobs to offer. The freed people sought land rather than wages.
Yet the legal frame left out of view all of these questions, notwith-
standing that they were at the heart of the Morant Bay insurrection.
Given the profound economic and social crises at hand in post-
243 Id. at 485.
244 Id. (quoting PALL MALL GAZETTE, June 13, 1868, at 4).
245 Id. at 431.
246 Id. at 485 (quoting MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, June io, 1868, at 4) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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emancipation Jamaica, as Kostal observes, "the Government's obses-
sion with things legal was more than passing strange. '247
The problem in Victorian empire seems to have been that the legal
materials on martial law - the cases, the statutes, the treatises -
were too thin to produce a robust set of rules. Legal authorities on
questions of martial law in the i86os were few and far between. The
law of empire, in other words, was not like the law of contracts or
property or negotiable paper. It was not even like Finlason's chief
area of expertise, the law of trusts. In these areas, myriad cases liti-
gated over generations had produced thickly populated fields of au-
thority. These were areas in which the legal frame regularly produced
workable answers to the everyday problems lawyers faced. But in the
law of empire, the patchwork of existing legal authorities failed to con-
strain the contending parties. Finlason, Cockburn, Stephen, and
Blackburn - all of these jurists and more were able to derive ostensi-
bly widely varying conclusions from the legal materials at hand. As a
consequence, the legal frame functioned as little more than the mouth-
piece of the contending sides for whatever (to put it in Professor Reid's
terms) they could plausibly argue and forcibly maintain.
This is the risk for which Yoo's work has become the most conven-
ient marker, for in our own time claims of executive power have done
as much as anything else to call into question the usefulness of the le-
gal frame. In a field notorious for the thinness of the legal authorities,
law talk on all sides risks becoming little more than a thinly disguised
repackaging of political or even partisan positions. Rasul, Hamdi, and
Hamdan have for now worked a rough restoration of British constitu-
tionalism's discursive boundaries. But each new round of develop-
ments in the United States's fight against terrorism threatens to undo
the Court's embattled compromise.2 48 In the next round, it will almost
certainly not be easy for the Court to maintain the fragile middle
ground it has staked out so far.
And that might prove dangerous. However muddled and messy,
however indeterminate and awkward, the legal frame's modest virtue
is its historical association with relatively less repressive forms of
global power. Kostal's most intriguing suggestion is that however
much the concern for legality may have distracted from underlying so-
cial causes of unrest, the persistence of the legal frame in the British
Empire helped to constrain empire's excesses, even in places like
247 Id. at 71. On the British Colonial Office's focus on court reform in Jamaica after i865, see
id. at 95-131, especially the discussion at id. at 128.
248 See, e.g., Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 26oo, 2635-36
(2006) (purporting to strip the courts of jurisdiction over alien detainee habeas petitions).
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Morant Bay.249 It is an argument that Ferguson should like and that
Hulsebosch's story supports. The legal frame and the constraints it
(sometimes) imposed are why the British imperial constitution will
haunt American law for years to come.
249 See KOSTAL, supra note 23, at 487. See generally AFRICAN PROCONSULS: EUROPEAN
GOVERNORS IN AFRICA (L.H. Gann & Peter Duignan eds., 1978) (describing the ruthlessness of
European colonial officials).
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NOTE
FEDERAL FUNDING FOR NEWCOMER SCHOOLS:
A BIPARTISAN IMMIGRANT EDUCATION INITIATIVE
Over the past year, immigration has gripped the nation's attention,
and for good reason. Immigration is increasing at a furious rate, and
the number of immigrants living in the United States is at an all-time
high.' This surge in immigration has sparked concerns about how the
children of immigrants from non-English-speaking countries - who
constitute over 9o% of those arriving in the United States 2 - should
be educated.
Students from non-English-speaking backgrounds make up the
fastest growing segment of the American student population: the num-
ber of students with limited English proficiency in U.S. schools has
almost doubled over the past decade. 3 Such students face special chal-
lenges upon arrival, not only because they do not speak the language,
but also because often they have received little or no formal schooling
in their native countries. The public schools in which they enroll,
however, often fail to respond effectively to the needs of many of these
immigrant students, who are far more likely to drop out of school than
their nonimmigrant peers. 4
To better serve high-risk immigrant populations, school districts in
many states have for years experimented with a promising initiative
that deserves increased federal attention: the newcomer school. New-
comer schools, which cater exclusively to non-English-speaking immi-
grants, are designed to help these students - particularly those who
have little prior schooling - learn the English language, learn about
American culture and how to balance the cultural environment at
school with the native cultural environment many still find at home,
and learn remedial academic content that will facilitate their transition
into the mainstream classroom. s
1 See Sandra Yin, Population Reference Bureau, The United States at 300 Million (Sept.
2oo6), http://www.prb.org/Template.cfm?Section=PRB&template=/ContentManagementlContent
Display.cfm&ContentlD= 14314.
2 Katherine Stapp, Newcomer Schools Reach Out to Older Students in the United States
(Apr. 4, 2ooo), http://www2.unesco.org/wef/en-news/usa.shtm.
3 JANA ECHEVARRIA ET AL., SCHOOL REFORM AND STANDARDS-BASED EDUCATION 2
(2005), available at http:// www.cal.org/crede/pubs/tech.reportE53C6.pdf.
4 See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
5 See MONICA FRIEDLANDER, THE NEWCOMER PROGRAM: HELPING IMMIGRANT
STUDENTS SUCCEED IN U.S. SCHOOLS (Nat'l Clearinghouse for Bilingual Educ., Program In-
formation Guide Series No. 8, igi), available at http://www.ncela.gwu.edu/pubs/pigs/pig8.htm.
These schools generally are meant to be temporary placements; students usually stay for six to
eighteen months before moving into mainstream bilingual or English-as-a-second-language (ESL)
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